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1 Introduction
The financial crisis of 2007/08 and the Great Recession that followed have led to a vast interest in
housing and its effect on the economy. A substantial amount of research has been devoted to better
understand the role of housing markets in the lending sector and its effect on the macroeconomy
(e.g. Favilukis et al., 2017; Piazzesi and Schneider, 2016; Jordà et al., 2016; Guerrieri and Iacoviello,
2017; Gertler and Gilchrist, 2018). Another strand of literature has examined the impact of housing
unaffordability on socio-economic outcomes such as labour supply and demand, consumption,
savings, education, health and income inequality (e.g. Quigley and Raphael, 2004; Campbell and
Cocco, 2007; Zabel, 2012; Gabriel and Painter, 2018). Policymakers have also expressed their
concern about the issue of unaffordability. For instance, in the UK, the housing market has been
defined as a “broken market” by the government in the White Paper issued by Department for
Communities & Local Government in 2017.
In this paper, we focus on the impact of the housing market and, in particular, housing
unaffordability on financial stability. The literature in this area argues that imbalances in the
housing market can directly affect the stability of the entire financial system. The banking sector
is the main channel of this effect and there are two transmission mechanisms. The first one, the
so-called “collateral channel”, implies a positive relationship between house prices and financial
stability (see Kiyotaki and Moore, 1997; Goodhart and Hofmann, 2008; Daglish, 2009; Niinimäki,
2009). The argument is that rising house prices increase the value of the collateral held by banking
institutions enhancing their total capital. This increase in the value of the collateral in turn has
two effects. First, the supply of credit to the real estate sector increases. Second, the probability
of default drops. Likewise, increasing house prices significantly reduce the probability of default of
mortgage borrowers and potential losses to lenders, resulting in a more stable banking industry.
The second effect, the “deviations hypothesis”, implies a negative relationship between persistent
deviations of house prices from fundamentals, or house price bubbles, and financial stability (see
Bernanke and Gertler, 1995; Allen and Gale, 2000; Allen and Carletti, 2013). This effect is due to
an increase in moral hazard problems, and to excessive risk taking and high risk accumulation.1
Koetter and Poghosyan (2010), in their analysis of regional house prices and banks in Germany,
test for these two transmission mechanisms. Their results support both hypotheses and conclude
1 Ferrari et al. (2015) consider the housing market as an important source of systemic risk and they
present a novel graphical approach to identify early signs of real estate related crisis. They conclude
that overvalued properties and increasing household debt are early indicators of a crisis.
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that increases in house prices result in more stable banks, but that in periods when prices deviate
from fundamental values, the probability of distress is higher.
Overall, the existing literature on housing markets and financial stability has focused on
issues such as default rates but it has not yet explored the relationship between the real estate
(RE) sector and systemic risk. We argue that the real estate sector contributes to the systemic risk
of the financial sector, partly through its impact on the banking sector.2 In this paper, we quantify
for the first time the systemic risk of the housing sector and examine the role of unaffordability in
its build-up.
Although a vast literature on systemic risk has emerged in the last decade and systemic
risk is nowadays a widely accepted concept, there is still no consensus about its exact definition,
neither a universally accepted measure. In 2009, the International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Bank
of International Settlements (BIS) and the Financial Stability Board (FSB), in their joint report to
the G-20, defined systemic risk as the disruption of the flow of financial services that could have a
negative impact on the macroeconomy caused by an institution or by part of the financial system.
Similarly, Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) argue that losses at the firm level that threaten the
capacity of the entire system and potentially harm the real economy could be described as systemic
risk. On the basis of this definition, the authors propose a systemic risk measure, called ∆CoVaR,
which is given by the difference between the Value at Risk (VaR) of the financial system when a
particular firm or institution is under distress relative and its median value. This is the measure
of systemic risk that we employ in this paper.
Our empirical analysis focuses on the UK because of the importance of its financial sector
in the international financial system and because, as mentioned above, its housing sector presents
increasing challenges for the public and for policymakers. To estimate the ∆CoVaR of the UK
RE sector, we use a large sample of RE firms listed on the London Stock Exchange. Overall,
the results of our analysis suggest that there is a strong tail dependency between the RE and
the financial sector, with a ∆CoVaR of 8.4%. At the cross-sectional level, we find that systemic
risk is associated with firm characteristics, in particular, with firms’ size and systematic risk as
2 The research on the real estate sector’s systemic risk is limited. Li et al. (2016) use Contingent Claims
Analysis to measure systemic risk in the RE sector in China. They use a Vector Autoregressive (VAR)
model and obtain a negative but temporary effect on banking returns in response to a shock in the
risk measure. Meng et al. (2014) use Random Matrix Theory to investigate the systemic risk and
spatiotemporal dynamics of the US housing market. Their findings suggest that the increasing risk since
early 1977 resulted to the 2007 bubble.
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measured by the CAPM beta. Movements of ∆CoVaR over time, on the other hand, are associated
to a number of housing variables, the macroeconomic environment, and firm characteristics. In
line with the collateral and deviations hypotheses, our findings suggest that, while sustainable
real house price changes are associated with a decline in systemic risk, house price exuberance
(as measured by the GSADF test of Phillips et al. (2015a,b)) and rapid increases in housing
unaffordability are associated with higher levels of systemic risk. With respect to macroeconomic
variables, we find that increases in the Bank of England base rate as well the unconventional
monetary policies adopted since 2009 are inversely related to systemic risk. Finally, undertaking
the analysis separately for commercial and for residential real estate companies yields qualitatively
similar results.
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 presents the methodology to
measure systemic risk, the data employed in the cross-sectional analysis, and the corresponding
results. Section 3 describes the dynamic model, the variables employed in the time series analysis,
and the main results of the paper. Section 4 provides brief conclusions.
2 Methodology
2.1 Measuring Systemic Risk
One of the most popular measures of a firm’s risk is its value at risk, VaR. A main limitation
of VaR is that it does not capture possible interactions between different financial institutions.
Thus, it can be used to inform microprudential policies but it is not informative for implementing
macroprudential policies. Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) developed the concepts of CoVaR and
∆CoVaR. These two measures of tail dependency capture the association between the risk of the
overall financial sector and a particular institution’s stress event. ∆CoVaR has already become a
popular measure of systemic risk and has been employed in many applications (see e.g. Fong et al.,
2009; Borri et al., 2014; Gauthier et al., 2012; Ugolini, 2017; de Mendonça and da Silva, 2018).
The VaR of institution i is defined by:
P(Ri ≤ V aRiq) = q,
where Ri stands for the return of institution i, and q denotes the confidence level. The Conditional
VaR (CoVaR) is, in turn, defined as the VaR of the financial system given that institution i is
under distress.
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The expression of the CoVaR is:
P (Rs ≤ CoV aRs|iq | Ri = V aRiq) = q,
where Rs is the return of the financial system.3 The marginal contribution of a particular institution
to the system’s risk, ∆CoVaR, is computed by comparing the CoV aRq with the one in “normal”
times, at the median (q = 0.5):
∆CoV aRiq = CoV aR
s|Ri=V aRq
q − CoV aRs|R
i=V aR0.5
q .
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier, the estimation of the ∆CoVaR is done through quantile
regressions. The procedure is described in the following 3 steps:4
1. Run the Quantile Regressions: Rst = aq + bqR
i
t + et
2. Use the estimates of aq and bq, âq and b̂q, from step 1, and the V aR
i
q obtained as the q% of
institution i ’s losses to compute
CoV aR
s|i
q = âq + b̂qV aR
i
q
3. Compute the systemic risk: ∆CoV aR
s|i
q = CoV aR
s|i
q − CoV aRs|i0.5
2.2 Data description and ∆CoVaR
We construct the RE portfolio using a market-capitalisation weighted average of 81 UK real estate
firms listed in the London Stock Exchange.5 The list of companies together with descriptive statis-
tics are displayed in Appendix B. The financial system index consists of all the banks, insurance,
real estate, general financial and investment trusts firms in the FTSE350 index. The banking sector
3 We note that the systemic risk measure CoVaR examines the system’s stress conditional on an individual
firm’s (or portfolio of firms) stress. This implies that the conditioning set to compute the system’s stress
varies cross-sectionally. The focus is therefore on the behaviour of the financial system’s returns assuming
a RE firm (or portfolio of firms) is in distress and to measure their tail dependency employing ∆CoV aR.
This approach differs from alternative measures of systemic risk that examine a firm’s stress conditional
on systemic risk (or on a systemic event such as a financial crisis). This is the case of the Systemic
Expected Shortfall (SES) measure developed by Acharya et al. (2017). The attractive feature of SES is
that the conditioning set is held constant across firms (as a way of ranking the systemic risk of firms),
while CoVaR has the advantage of keeping the analysis within the standard regulatory tool of VaR.
4 There are alternative methods to obtain the ∆CoVaR. For instance, Girardi and Ergün (2013) employ
a multivariate GARCH model. We have also used this method, but the results, presented in Appendix
A, suggest that it does not perform as well in capturing the build-up of systemic risk ahead of the crisis.
5 This data is obtained from Datastream and Morningstar.
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index is constructed by using data for all the banks included in the FTSE350 index. The frequency
of the data is monthly and the sample period is from June 2002 until July 2018.6
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics together with the VaR of the RE portfolio, the
financial system, and the banking sector. As can be seen from this table, the overall financial
system index is the more diversified of the three, and displays the highest average return and
the lowest variability and tail risk for this sample period. The unconditional 95th percentile VaR
of the financial system index is 7.15%. Conditioning on the RE sector being under stress, the
VaR increases by 74%. Furthermore, the ∆CoVaR is 8.4%. These statistics suggest a strong tail
dependency between the RE sector and the financial system. The RE sector is therefore systemic
as a herd. Following the theoretical arguments and stylised facts discussed in the introduction, we
conjecture that this association between stress in RE firms and the overall risk of the financial
system is possibly transmitted through the banking sector. The last row of Table 1 shows that the
risk of the banking sector is significantly higher when the RE sector risk is high,7 providing support
to this argument.8 Overall, the results in this section already endorse the ECB’s recommendation
in their 2015 report of close supervision to the RE sector and the convenience of macroprudential
tools designed for this purpose. We proceed with the cross-sectional analysis of systemic risk and
RE firm characteristics.
[Insert Table 1]
2.3 Cross-sectional Results: Systematic, idiosyncratic and systemic risks
Idiosyncratic and systemic risk are different concepts. The former only affects a particular firm
and will not ripple out to the rest of the system, while the latter is about the risk that a particular
firm induces to the overall financial system. Figure 1a shows that there is no strong cross-sectional
6 The frequency and period of the analysis is restricted by some of the variables needed to implement the
dynamic model described in the next section.
7 As a robustness exercise, we have also computed the systemic risk measures using the FTSE350 RE
index instead of the portfolio of the 81 RE firms described above. The results are similar. We decided
to employ the portfolio of 81 companies instead of only the ones in the FTSE350 RE index in our main
analysis in order to have a more comprehensive and representative sample of the sector.
8 The banking sector’s VaR increases by 47% conditional on the RE market being under distress. We have
also reversed the analysis to check if in periods when banks are stressed, the RE firms’ risk increases.
The ∆CoV aRREbank is 6.78%. Although the effect is sizeable, we note that it is lower than ∆CoV aR
bank
RE ,
which may be indicative that the effect of the correlation runs from the real estate sector to the banking
institutions.
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connection between the VaR and systemic risk. This highlights the importance of having indicators
that can capture systemic rather than idiosyncratic risk for macroprudential purposes. The findings
are in line with Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) who support that there is only a weak link between
an institution’s risk in isolation (VaR), and its marginal contribution to systemic risk (∆CoVaR).
However, they point out that there is a strong positive time series relationship. They argue that
a potential explanation behind the lack of cross-section correlation between the two measures of
risk is the interlinkages of each firm with the rest of the financial system.
For example, we observe that Harworth Group and Capital & Regional have the highest
VaR values of the sample with 24.17% and 23.85%, respectively. However, the values of ∆CoVaR
for these two firms are low, 2.63% and 2.35%. Therefore, when the two RE firms are in distress, the
VaR of the system only increases slightly. On the other hand, British Land and Land Securities,
two of the biggest RE firms in the UK market, contribute significantly to the systemic risk (8%),
but the VaR of both of them is relatively low at 10.6% and 12.4%, respectively.
[Insert Figure 1]
Similarly, there is a difference between systemic and systematic or market risk. Systematic
risk is the inherent part of the risk of an asset coming from the market that cannot be diversified
away. Figure 1b shows the relationship between ∆CoVaR and CAPM beta, the most common
measure of market risk. We observe a positive and significant relationship between these two types
of risk.9 Firms that are closely related with the market (high systematic risk) also present high
values of ∆CoVaR. For instance, the RE companies that carry the highest systemic risk, such as
British Land, Land Securities, Segro, Derwent London and Workspace, also present the highest
values for market risk, between 0.7 and 1.01.
2.4 Firm Characteristics
We first examine if the years that a company is on operation affects the value of ∆CoVaR. The
results presented in Figure 2a show that this is not the case in our sample. On the other hand, size,
measured by the log of the average market capitalisation divided by the cross sectional average,
has a statistically significant positive relationship with systemic risk (see Figure 2b). This result is
9 All the regression analyses of this section are available upon request.
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further validated by the use of assets and liabilities as can be seen in figures 2c and 2d. Therefore,
the greater the magnitude of the firm’s operations the more prominent its systemic risk is.
[Insert Figure 2]
Another firm characteristic that has been typically employed in analyses about systemic
risk is leverage. However, this variable is not available at the monthly or even quarterly frequency
for the RE companies under consideration. Nevertheless, we have compared the average annual
leverage (debt/capital or debt/equity ratios) with the ∆CoVaR. We find a positive relationship
but the results are statistically insignificant.
Overall, the results presented in this section suggest that returns in the RE sector and
in the UK financial system have a significant left-tail correlation. Furthermore, they suggest that
certain factors at the firm level, such as systematic risk and size, affect the value of systemic
risk. However, these results are not informative about the time variation in systemic risk since
the CoVaR measure provides an estimate of systemic risk of the RE firms over the whole sample
period. To study the time-variation in systemic risk and the variables that contributed to its build
up before the financial crisis, we introduce a dynamic model of CoVaR in the next section.
3 A Dynamic Model of Systemic Risk
Following Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), we allow the returns of the real estate firms and of the
sector as a whole to depend on a set of state variables, St. We note that these variables are not
considered to be factors of systemic risk, but they are used because they can capture time variation
in the conditional moments of the returns. As suggested by Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016), the
state variables should be highly liquid and tractable. We employ changes in the three-month yield,
changes in the yield curve, the TED spread, credit spread, FTSE100 volatility (VIX), and returns
of the FTSE100. Table 2 presents descriptive statistics of these variables.
[Insert Table 2]
The estimation procedure of the dynamic model for the ∆CoVaR is described by the
following five steps:
1. Run the quantile regression: Rit = aq + cqS
i
t−1 + et
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2. Use the estimates (âiq, ĉ
i











q V aRit(q) + c
s|iSt−1 + ut




q and ĉs|i) to obtain the Conditional VaR:
CoV aR
s|i




q V aRit(q) +
ˆcs|iSt−1
5. Compute the systemic risk: ∆CoV aR
s|i
t (q) = CoV aR
s|i
t (q)− CoV aR
s|i
t (0.5)
3.1 House prices, affordability and systemic risk
To examine the effect of house prices and housing affordability on systemic risk, we adopt a
regression model, similar to that of Brunnermeier et al. (2017) in their analysis of the banking
sector of the OECD economies:
| ∆CoV aRs|it (q)| = αi + βHt−1 + γCi,t−1 + δMt−1 + εi,t. (1)
The dependent variable is expressed in absolute values so that higher values of |∆CoV aRs|it (q)|
correspond to a larger contribution of institution i to systemic risk. H represents the variables
related to housing, C denotes firm characteristics, and M refers to the macroeconomic variables.
Starting with firm characteristics, C, these include idiosyncratic risk (V aRi) and size (log of market
capitalisation of firm i).10
The exogenous aggregate macroeconomic risk factors, M , are controlled for by the growth
rate of GDP in the UK, growth of credit and investments, the rate of inflation, returns on the
selective stock market index FTSE100, leverage, and the stance of monetary policy. Leverage is
measured by net debt divided by the market capitalization of the UK financial sector index provided
by Datastream.11 The stance of monetary policy is measured by two variables due to the presence of
the zero lower bound. We employ the Bank of England base rate until 2009 to capture conventional
monetary policy, and from then onward, we include the shadow rate computed using the method
by Wu and Xia (2016) to control for unconventional policies. Monthly GDP is calculated using
the Chow-Lin interpolation method and data for quarterly Real GDP from the FRED database
10 While there is no significant cross-section relationship between VaR and ∆CoVaR, there is indeed a
relationship between those two variables at the time series dimension as can be seen in figure A.3.
However, these two variables provide different information. For most of the period ∆CoVaR is above
VaR, and specially noteworthy is the difference in the build up of the financial crisis.
11 We have also considered an alternative measure of leverage, the Leverage Index provided by the Center
of Risk Management Lausanne (data available at: http://www.crml.ch/index.php/systemic_risk/).
The results with this alternative measure of financial leverage, available upon request, were similar to
the ones reported below and we have therefore omitted them.
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(Federal Reserve Bank of St. Louis) and the monthly Industrial Production index from Bank of
England statistics. The inflation rate is computed using the consumer price index (CPI) from the
OECD Main Indicators. Finally, to capture credit cycles we use data on investments and credit
obtained from the International Financial Statistics (IFS) database and the Bank of England,
respectively.12
The set of housing market factors, H, includes three variables that are constructed using
data from the International House Price Database of the Federal Reserve Bank of Dallas (see
Mack et al., 2011; and Pavlidis et al., 2016). The first variable is real house prices. The second
is a housing exuberance dummy that takes the value of unity when the recursive right-tail unit
root test statistic, BSADF, of Phillips et al. (2015a,b) exceeds the corresponding critical value.
The last variable is a measure of housing affordability. Despite its importance, the measures of
affordability available are few (for a survey see Meen, 2018). These measures are based on either
low frequency data, a specific part of the population such as first-time buyers, or regional indices.
This makes them non-applicable in our context because our aim is to examine affordability at
the nationwide level and at a relatively high frequency. To deal with this issue we focus on the
time series properties of real house prices to disposable income. Specifically, we construct a housing
unaffordability dummy variable which, similarly to the housing exuberance dummy, takes the value
of one when the BSADF statistic of the ratio of real house price to real disposable income exceeds
the corresponding critical value. Figure 3 presents the estimated recursive unit root test statistics
together with the 95% critical values.
[Insert Figure 3]
3.2 Empirical Results
Table 3 presents estimation results for the dynamic model. Overall, the results are in line with
both the “collateral” and “deviations” channels. In particular, the relationship between |∆CoVaR|
and house prices is negative and statistically significant, which supports the “collateral channel”.
That is, during periods of increasing prices, the financial system is more stable. However, during
periods when house prices display explosive dynamics, their impact on systemic risk reverses and
turns positive. The positive impact on systemic risk is even higher when we employ the measure
12 These two variables have been adjusted to monthly frequency using cubic spline interpolation.
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of unaffordability. In this case, the estimated coefficient is significantly larger. These latter results
are consistent with the “deviations hypothesis”.13
Our results also suggest that firm characteristics relate to systemic risk. First, we find that
a firm’s idiosyncratic risk (VaR) is positively correlated with systemic risk. A positive relationship
between these two measures of risk is in line with the work of Adrian and Brunnermeier (2016) for
the banking sector. In our case, this suggests that systemic risk closely follows the time-variation
of the idiosyncratic risk carried by the RE firms. Second, our results suggest that the larger the
size of the firm the higher its systemic risk.
[Insert Table 3]
Turning to the set of variables that control for the macroeconomic environment, we ob-
serve that they all have the expected sign. The growth rate of real GDP has a negative effect
on systemic risk. Credit booms increase the level of risk, and the Investment-to-GDP ratio is
negatively related to |∆CoVaR|. The estimates of the effect of these control variables are in line
with the findings of Brunnermeier et al. (2017). In addition, we find that higher levels of financial
leverage are associated with higher systemic risk, which is in line with existing literature (Acharya
and Thakor, 2016). The positive coefficient on leverage is the expected one given that the (neg-
ative) externality of the RE sector on the financial sector is expected to be larger under a less
well capitalised system. Regarding the impact of monetary policy, we find that while tightening
in “normal” times would reduce the level of systemic risk, during periods of zero-lower-bound,
measures of quantitative easing help to tame the risk in the system. Finally, a bear stock market
would increase the correlation between downside risk in RE firms and the financial sector.
So far we have not differentiated RE firms according to their type of business: commercial
or residential.14 The distinction between the two groups of RE firms is relevant for policy analysis
purposes. This is so because, compared to Residential RE firms (RRE), Commercial RE companies
(CRE) account for a larger share of GDP, and are more vulnerable to the business cycles exhibiting
13 We have also considered an alternative approach to the one of having three separate regressions for each
of the variables in the set of housing market factors, H, as reported in Table 3. This approach involved
having two separate regression specifications. The first specification included real house prices and the
housing exuberance dummy in the same model and the second real house prices and housing affordability.
In both cases, the macroeconomic risk factors, M , and the firm characteristic factors, C, remained the
same as in Table 3. The results not reported here, but available upon request, were qualitatively similar
to the ones in Table 3.
14 In Appendix C we provide information about the composition of the RE companies by type of business
and their corresponding systemic risk measures.
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higher default rates. We analyse whether our results differ across these two groups of RE firms and
present the results in Table 4.15 Overall, we observe only small differences. House prices appear
to amplify more the tail dependency between CRE firms and the financial sector. However, when
housing unaffordability rapidly rises, the increase in systemic risk is greater for RRE than for CRE
firms.
[Insert Table 4]
3.3 Exposure of the UK Banking Sector to the Housing Market
In the introduction, we conjectured that the transmission mechanism that makes the RE sector
systemically important is the banking sector. Several empirical studies have already provided evi-
dence about the effect of the RE sector on banks’ profitability and stability. For instance, Elyasiani
et al. (2010) examine the relationship between commercial banks and real estate investment trusts
(REITs). They find that financial intermediaries’ returns are highly sensitive to the real estate
market. A shock to REITs’ returns spillovers to the banking sector, as well as to insurance com-
panies and savings and loans companies. Martins et al. (2011) find that the housing market has a
significant impact on the profitability and default risk of banks, specially of small size.
We contribute to this growing literature by quantifying the association between stress in
RE companies and the banking sector. To do so we run the following regression of ∆CoV aRi
bank
on housing and macroeconomic variables, as well as firm characteristics. Similarly to the previous
model, the housing variables include house prices and exuberance indicators.
[Insert Table 5]
The results are presented in table 5. First, the coefficient on house prices is negative,
implying that sustainable house price growth is associated with less risk in the banking sector,
and drop in prices with higher risk, possibly due to more vulnerable balance sheets caused by the
exposure to mortgages and properties used as collateral. Second, during periods of house price
exuberance, or “bubbles”, this relationship is reversed. Furthermore, unaffordability plays a role,
increasing the dependency of the RE firms and banks in periods of distress.16 The effect of the
15 The coefficients of the variables that control for firm characteristics, C, and macroeconomic environment,
M , barely change and are therefore not reported here.
16 Similarly to the analysis reported in Table 3 and discussed in footnote 13, we have estimated two
alternative regression model specifications. One with real house prices and the housing exuberance
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firm characteristics and macroeconomic environment is qualitatively similar to the one shown in
the previous table of results. We have also examined, as we did in the previous section, whether
the effects of house prices and affordability on the co-movement in the tails between RE companies
and the banking sector depends upon the type of business. The results in table 6 show that the
coefficients on the housing variables, H, are larger for CRE than for RRE firms. House price bubbles
and unaffordability strengthen the degree of correlation between banks and CRE companies more
than for RRE firms.
[Insert Table 6]
Overall, our findings not only contribute to a better understanding of the links between
the RE and the banking sector but also provide additional information about the systemic risk of
the banking sector which has been extensively researched in recent times. In addition to this, we
provide in Appendix D an analysis about the dependency between risk in the “Big Four” banks
in the UK (Lloyds, RBS, Barclays, and HSBC) and the RE sector. We find that while the tail
dependency between the RE sector and these four banks is substantial, it decreases with the level
of international diversification.
4 Conclusions
Two of the topics that have attracted considerable attention since the financial crisis of 2007-08
are housing and systemic risk. This paper is at the intersection of these two fields and contributes
to them by quantifying the systemic risk of the real estate sector. We focus on the UK due to the
importance of its financial sector in the international financial system and the role that housing
plays in the determination of socio-economic outcomes. Our findings indicate that there is strong
dependency between downside risk in the financial system and the real estate sector. In particular,
when returns in the real estate sector are in distress, the value-at-risk of the entire financial system
is higher by 74%. Looking at the determinants of systemic risk, we find that while moderate house
prices movements positively relate to the level of financial stability, exuberance in house prices
and housing unaffordability are associated with higher levels of systemic risk. In addition, firm
characteristics and macro variables appear to play a role in the tail dependency between RE and
dummy, and another where we included real house prices and housing affordability. The results, available
upon request, were similar to the ones in Table 5 for the former specification. For the latter, real house
prices were not statistically significant.
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financial sector. Most notably, an increase of the Bank of England base rate in normal times and
the implementation of unconventional monetary policy are related to lower systemic risk.
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Appendix
A Alternative Methodology: A GARCH Approach
An alternative procedure to estimate the dynamic ∆CoVaR is to use a bivariate GARCH model.
The first step is to estimate the dynamic VaR using a GARCH(1,1) model. The main assumptions
are:
Rt+1 = µ+ et+1





et+1 = σt+1zt+1, where z ∼ N(0, 1)
| V aRt+1| = µ̂+ ˆσt+1F−1a
Figure A.1 illustrates the VaR obtained by using the two alternative methodologies. For
the financial sector, the results are similar for most of the period. The most significant deviation
is observed during 2007-2009, when the state variables model implies a higher systemic risk than
the one produced with the GARCH method. This pattern is similar for the RE sector.
[Insert Figure A.1]
We now specify the bivariate GARCH model for returns of the financial system and the
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VaRiq(t) = Φ(q%)





1− ρ2i,t + Φ(q%)−1ρi,tσS,t
Therefore: ∆CoV aRiq(t) = Φ(q%)
−1ρi,tσi,t
We note that the main factors affecting the value of systemic risk are the correlation
coefficient (ρi) and the dynamic volatility of the financial system (σS,t). Both the time-varying
correlation coefficient and the standard deviation are estimated with a DCC specification. The
figure below illustrates the dynamic ∆CoVaR estimated with both methods. We observe that the
estimated systemic risk employing the GARCH method increases only right at the inception of the
financial crisis. The method employing state variables better captures the build up of systemic risk
ahead of the crisis and that this is another reason we employ it in our main analysis of the paper.
[Insert Figure A.2]
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B Static ∆CoVaR: Individual Real Estate Firms
Real Estate Firms I
Name Mnemonic VaR CoVaRfin ∆CoVaRfin CoVaRbank ∆CoVaRbank
Land Securities Group LAND 12.40% 13.08% 7.78% 15.47% 6.91%
British Land BLND 10.57% 13.71% 8.29% 16.3% 7.56%
Segro SGRO 13.26% 12.91% 8.61% 15.78% 8.42%
Hammerson HMSO 12.50% 11.22% 6.17% 18.23% 7.69%
Derwent London DLN 12.09% 11.78% 7.41% 17.74% 8.63%
Shaftesbury SHB 12.55% 11.71% 6.60% 17.30% 8.47%
Intu Properties INTU 10.81% 9.78% 4.83% 16.49% 7.00%
Capital & Counties Prop CAPC 10.78% 8.26% 4.18% 14.37% 6.31%
Unite Group UTG 16.98% 9.59% 4.78% 15.55% 5.41%
Great Portland Estates GPOR 9.43% 10.07% 5.16% 19.71% 10.29%
Workspace Group WKP 16.94% 13.84% 8.83% 20.00% 11.02%
Big Yellow Group BYG 11.31% 10.57% 5.6% 15.82% 5.65%
Assura AGR 14.32% 7.57% 1.35% 11.74% 1.96%
Grainger GRI 14.33% 8.80% 2.71% 13.61% 3.45%
Savills SVS 13.81% 11.30% 5.71% 15.05% 5.20%
Purplebricks Group PURP 20.96% 6.88% 2.08% 11.05% 3.39%
Safestore SAFE 12.71% 10.11% 3.07% 13.72% 2.56%
CLS Holdings CLI 10.9% 11.02% 5.46% 16.31% 6.34%
Daejan Holdings DJAN 10.35% 10.11% 5.01% 14.65% 5.65%
St Modwen Prop. SMP 17.66% 11.69% 6.35% 16.77% 7.82%
RDI Reit RDI 16.61% 9.75% 4.10% 16.02% 6.30%
Londonmetric Prop. LMP 7.29% 8.45% 1.61% 14.30% 2.96%
Hansteen Holdings HSTN 9.05% 12.26% 6.77% 20.67% 9.31%
Urban Civic UANC 18.43% 11.79% 4.41%% 15.57% 5.37%
Helical Reit HLCL 14.20% 12.02% 4.74% 15.19% 4.64%
Mountview Estate MTVW 8.69% 11.47% 4.71% 15.64% 5.33%
Capital & Regional CAL 24.17% 8.85% 2.63% 14.81% 3.89%
Harworth Group HWG 23.85% 9.89% 2.35% 15.87% 3.59%
Mucklow A&J Group MKLW 12.00% 10.96% 3.11% 15.32% 4.39%
U & I Group UAI 15.96% 10.02% 3.97% 17.40% 6.64%
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Real Estate Firms II
Name Mnemonic VaR CoVaRfin ∆CoVaRfin CoVaRbank ∆CoVaRbank
LSL Properties LSL 20.36% 10.32% 4.03% 14.94% 3.33%
Countrywide CWD 28.11% 5.10% 1.82% 8.97% 1.18%
McKay Securities MCKS 8.96% 8.66% 2.89% 14.35% 3.66%
Foxtons Group FOXT 23.46% 4.96% 1.46% 8.66% 1.31%
Conygar Invest. CIC 10.26% 8.34% 1.59% 13.18% 2.34%
Palace Capital PCA 22.84% 6.75% 0.14% 14.09% 3.69%
Town Centre Securities TOWN 14.00% 11.81% 6.15% 16.77% 7.80%
Inland Homes INL 19.08% 9.43% 3.30% 14.31% 3.75%
Lok’n Stores Group LOK 14.10% 11.43% 4.41% 15.95% 5.67%
Real Estate Investors RLE 13.11% 9.10% 2.34% 15.28% 4.56%
Newriver Reit NRR 6.35% 8,26% 3,65% 14,60% 5,50%
Highcroft Investments HCFT 6.11% 9.30% 2.72% 13.56% 2.65%
Property Franchise Group TPFG 15.06% 6.15% 2.80% 11.48% 4.34%
Caledonian Trust CNN 12.89% 9.76% 2.67% 14.40% 3.25%
London & Assocs. Prop. LAS 12.41% 10.06% 2.43% 12.52% 2.17%
Cardiff Properties CDFF 5.51% 9.22% 1.88% 14.60% 3.14%
Wynnstay Prop WSP 6.33% 9.58% 1.66% 14.28% 2.67%
Hunters Property HUNT 11.45% 5.47% 12.24% 9.82% 0.82%
HML Holdings HMLH 20.04% 8.08% 1.58% 13.94% 2.33%
M Winkworth WINK 10.64% 6.49% 0.77% 10.91% 1.11%
Safeland SAF 18.33% 10.11% 2.61% 12.52% 1.58%
Steward & Wight STE 7.69% 10.73% 2.37% 12.69% 1.22%
Fletcher King FLK 15.73% 10.64% 4.11% 16.53% 5.44%
Belvoir Lettings BLV 14.47% 4.58% 0.73% 11.09% 2.32%
Panther Securities PNS 7.57% 10.52% 3.18% 13.29% 2.02%
Secure Inc. Reit SIR 7.78% 6.38% 2.96% 9.24% 1.23%
GCP Students Lettings DIGS 2,91% 5,32% 1,34% 8,95% 1,22%
Local Shop Reit LSR 15,03% 9,97% 5,10% 13.26% 2,23%
AEW UK Reit AEWU 3.09% 6,85% 2.83% 11.34% 4.00%
Alpha Real Trust ARTL 10.61% 9.52% 1.89% 16.42% 4.23%
22 House Prices, (Un)Affordability and Systemic Risk
Real Estate Firms III
Name Mnemonic VaR CoVaRfin ∆CoVaRfin CoVaRbank ∆CoVaRbank
Axa Property Trust APT 9.67% 7.52% 0.61% 11.07% 0.25%
Custodian Reit CREI 2.38% 5.54% 1.07% 11.84% 2.20%
Drum Inc. Reit DRIP 4.21% 5.29% 0.65% 9.23% 0.78%
Ediston Prop. EPIC 2.95% 6.22% 2.09% 12.29% 4.87%
F&C Com. Prop. FCPT 6.26% 8.69% 2.78% 14.45% 4.28%
KCR Residential Reit KCR 20.69% 8.69% 2.78% 14.45% 4.28%
Picton Prop. Trust PCTN 14.12% 8.08% 2.12% 13.87% 3.78%
Regional Reit RGL 4.49% 7.54% 4.12% 10.39% 3.97%
UK Com. Prop Trust IKCM 7.05% 12.22% 3.47% 12.60% 1.72%
Tritax Big Box Reit BBOX 4.21% 5.63% 1.84% 9.21% 1.71%
Target Healthcare Reit THRL 3.56% 3.17% 0.63% 7.04% 0.94%
Std.Lf.Inv.Prop.Inc Trust SLI 9.08% 8.84% 3.22% 13.85% 4.03%
F&C UK Rlst. Inv. FCRE 10.73% 9.47% 4.13% 14.91% 5.04%
Summit Germany SMTG 5.46% 5.74% 1.64% 12.05% 3.30%
Raven Russia RUS 18.33% 11.20% 5.33% 16.18% 6.90%
Sirius Real Estate SRE 18.30% 10.35% 3.70% 18.55% 5.13%
Vordere VOR 25.18% 2.07% 1.77% 6.16% 2.65%
Alpha Pyrenees Trust ALPH 40.55% 10.06% 3.33% 12.80% 2.80%
Globalworth Reit GWI 8.47% 10.06% 3.23% 12.80% 2.80%
Macau Prop.Opp. Fund MPO 10.29% 11.45% 4.92% 16.51% 6.86%
Schroder Reit SERE 8.22% 2.21% 3.95% 1.66% 7.91%
Notes: The table reports the average systemic risk contribution of individual UK RE firms. The examined period is
2002m6-2018m7 and all the observations are obtained from Datastream. The system indices are FTSE350 financial
system that includes all banks, investment funds, general financial, insurance and RE companies and FTSE350
Banks to measure the dependecy with the banking sector. The measures of risk are estimated for the 95% quantile,
and they expressed in absolute values.
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C Residential and Commercial Real Estate Firms
We distinguish between firms that focus on commercial property and those that focus on resi-
dential property. In the first group we include all the industrial and retail RE firms. These firms
hold portfolios of warehouses, shopping centres, hotels, restaurants, storage facilities and medical
centres. The second group own and manage properties available for occupation and for no-business
purposes, and they are also involved in property development and trading.
Figure A.4 shows the weights of each group in the construction of the RE portfolio. The
commercial real estate firms constitute more than 50% of the index, while only one in four firms is
residential-focused. For the rest of firms, 16% have a mixed portfolio of commercial and residential
and 9% are classified separately as international firms. These are mostly RE companies that are
traded in the London Stock Exchange (LSE) but their asset are located in foreign countries.
[Insert Figure A.4]
Table A.1 shows that the systemic risk of commercial RE (CRE) and residential RE
(RRE) companies is very similar around 8%, although it is higher for CRE firms when the impact
is measured only on the banking sector. This result provides support to the analysis of the ECB’s
report in 2015 that suggests that CRE companies have higher loan-to-value (LTV) ratios and
strong cyclicality leading to higher default risk.
[Insert Table A.1]
D The effect on the “Big Four”
We apply the ∆CoVaR methodology to examine the impact of the real estate market to individual
UK banking institutions. For this analysis, we employ the four systemically important banks in
the UK, namely, Lloyds Banking Group, Barclays, Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) and HSBC.
These four companies own around 45% of the mortgage market share.17 Table A.2 presents the
market shares of each bank for the UK mortgage gross lending based on the data provided by
UK Finance and CML. We first confirm that these four banks are systemically important in the
UK by computing their ∆CoV aRij , or the level of risk of the financial system when these banking
institutions are under distress.
17 Nationwide is the second largest mortgage lender (12.3%), but it is a building society hence not in the
London Stock Exchange. We also leave out Santander because this company is not traded in the UK
stock market either.
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[Insert Table A.2]
In Table A.3 we can observe that the systemic importance of the banks is related to
their share in the mortgage market. Lloyds and RBS have higher ∆CoVaR than the other two
institutions. To examine the exposure of the banks to the real estate market, we estimate the
∆CoV aRiRE , that is, the VaR of each individual bank when the RE portfolio is under distress.
RBS and Lloyds are the most vulnerable to the housing market. When the returns of the real
estate portfolio are at their V aR95%, the risk measure of the two banks increases by 24.42% and
17.5%, respectively. The exposure of Barclays and HSBC is lower, as expected, due to their more
international focus on different banking operations such as investment and corporate banking.
[Insert Table A.3]
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Tables
Table 1: Data Description of Sector Indices and RE Portfolio
Index Mean Returns St.Deviation V aR95%
Financial Sector 0.50% 4.43 7.15%
Banking Sector -0.45% 6.69 11.41%











12.42% 8.43% 16.72% 8.46%
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the market indices and the real
estate portfolio. The sample period is 2002m6-2018m7 and all the quantities are
expressed in monthly frequency. All the estimates of risk are expressed in absolute
values.
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Table 2: State Variables Summary Statistics
Variables Mean Std Dev Skewness Min Max
Three month yield (change) -2.63 20.86 -8.47 -178.8 26.20
Yield Curve (change) -0.19 24.44 1.39 -52.3 121.7
TED Spread 25.18 31.08 3.37 0.813 215.12
Credit Spread 1.04 29.47 3.64 -95.9 225.87
FTSE100 Volatiliy (VIX) 18.83 7.94 1.61 9.55 54.15
FTSE100 Returns 0.20 3.94 -0.76 -13.96 8.30
Notes: The table reports summary statistics for the state variables employed to
estimate the dynamic model of systemic risk. The spreads and changes in spreads
are expressed in monthly basis points, and the returns in monthly percentages.
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Table 3: Systemic Risk of the RE sector (∆CoV aRFinRE )





















-0.342 -0.350 -0.328MP base rate
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.314 0.290 0.289Shadow rate (QE)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.311 -0.310 -0.304Stock Market
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.45 0.45 0.45
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from panel regressions of |∆CoV aRfini | for
the sample of the 81 UK RE firms on firm characteristics, housing and macroeco-
nomic variables. The exuberance indicator dummy variables are estimated based on
the BSADF approach. The firm size is measured by the log of Market Capitalisation
divided by the sector’s average. P-values are displayed in parentheses.
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Table 4: Systemic Risk of the RE sector
Analysis by type of business







Notes: This table reports the coefficients from panel regressions of
|∆CoV aRfini | for two sub-samples of the RE sector (residential and com-
mercial) on firm characteristics, housing and macroeconomic variables. The
rest of the variables are not presented since the estimates are qualitatively
similar to the previous table. P-values are displayed in parentheses.
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Table 5: Dependency between RE and Banking Sector (∆CoV aRbankRE )





















-0.414 -0.432 -0.406MP base rate
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
0.420 0.383 0.378Shadow rate (QE)
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
-0.500 -0.499 -0.490Stock Market
(0.000) (0.000) (0.000)
R2 0.48 0.48 0.48
Notes: This table reports the coefficients from panel regressions of |∆CoV aRbanki |
for the sample of the 81 UK RE firms on firm characteristics, housing and macroeco-
nomic variables. The exuberance indicator dummy variables are estimated based on
the BSADF approach. The firm size is measured by the log of Market Capitalisation
divided by the sector’s average. P-values are displayed in the parentheses.
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Table 6: Dependency between RE sector and Banking sector
Analysis by type of business







Notes: This table reports the coefficients from panel regressions of
|∆CoV aRbanki | for two sub-samples of the RE sector (residential and com-
mercial) on firm characteristics, housing and macroeconomic variables. The
rest of the variables are not presented since the estimates are qualitatively
similar to the previous table. P-values are displayed in parentheses.
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Table A.1: RE Systemic Risk by type of business
Group No of Firms Market Cap VaR ∆CoVaRfin ∆CoVaRbank
81 100% 8.59% 8.32% 8.46%All Companies
73 91.11% 8.49% 8.38% 8.49%All excl. International
39 50.83% 9.17% 7.87% 9.11%Commercial
21 23.72% 10.41% 7.94% 10.43%Residential
13 16.56% 8.12% 5.69% 7.98%Diversified
8 8.89% 8.07% 3.40% 4.61%International
Notes: The table reports the estimates for the systemic risk measures for different sub-sectors of the
RE sector. The examined period is 2002m6-2018m7 and all the quantities are expressed in monthly
frequency. All the estimates of risk are expressed in absolute values.
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Table A.2: UK Mortgage Market Lending Market Shares
Bank 2017 2016 2015 2014
Lloyds Banking Group 16% 15.6% 17.5% 19.5%
Royal Bank of Scotland 12% 12.9% 11.2% 9.7%
Barclays 9% 8.4% 8.6% 10%
HSBC 7.1% 6.4% 5.8% 6.2%
Total 44.1% 43.3% 43.1% 45.4%
*Source: UK Finance and CML
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Lloyds Banking Group 19.95% 7.99% 17.5%
Royal Bank of Scotland 20.59% 6.10% 24.42%
Barclays 16.01% 5.42% 11.80%
HSBC 10.18% 5.61% 5.51%
Notes: The table reports the estimates for the ∆CoV aR measures of the banking sector.
The examined period is 2002m6-2018m7 and all the quantities are expressed in monthly
frequency. All the estimates of risk are expressed in absolute values.
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Figures
Fig. 1: Systemic Risk, VaR and CAPM beta
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Fig. 2: Firm Characteristics and ∆CoVaRfin
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Fig. 3: Exuberance in the UK Housing Market
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Figure A.1: Dynamic VaR: Alternative Methodologies
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Figure A.2: Dynamic ∆CoVaR: Alternative Methodologies
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Figure A.3: VaR and CoVaR of the Financial System Index
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Figure A.4: Weights on the RE Portfolio
